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This chapTer introduces the urban issue 
of the year — the air quality problem in China’s 
cities — in relation to the ‘Civilised City’ system. 
The system combines Maoist-style campaigns 
with ideals of urban modernisation, bestowing 
the honour of the title ‘Civilised City’ on cho-
sen places of reform. A hybrid form of social 
control and urban governance, the National 
Civilised City program sets out goals that en-
compass government accountability, air quality 
monitoring and improved public infrastructure 
including cultural facilities, in addition to pro-
grams promoting volunteerism and ‘healthy’ 
ideals for urban youth. It is a broad-based ap-
proach for all cities that recalibrates the party-
state’s political and social agendas in relation 
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The relation between the appearance of the air and health-threatening 
levels of PM2.5 lies in the numbers. As we noted in Yearbook 2012, the US 
Embassy’s webpage and twitter feed ‘BeijingAir’ introduced the concept 
of PM2.5 to Chinese citizens in 2009. The authorities protested against 
this statistical incursion into local air sovereignty. In a tone of high dud-
geon, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged that ‘air quality data should 
not follow a “market-based” approach’. It was concerned because PM2.5 
information released by the embassy had ‘resulted in the Chinese public 
now questioning “unnecessarily” the validity of Beijing EPB’s [Environ-
mental Protection Bureau’s] data.’ The ministry declared that the ‘Beijing 
In 2012–2013, many cities in the People’s Republic of China started regular-
ly reporting air quality data for PM2.5 — the measurement for micro-par-
ticulate airborne pollutants that are implicated in a range of serious health 
threats. PM2.5 in the air sometimes appears like a ground fog or mist, and 
photographs of urban streets thick with smog in China often look like fog-
bound river valleys or coasts. Rather than being identified by weather fore-
casters as unsightly and threatening ‘air pollution’ (kongqi wuran 空气污染), 
in recent years the authorities have encouraged the use of the more poetic 
expression ‘dun mists’ (yinmai 阴霾). California tule fog — the winter fog of 
the San Joaquin Valley — can look worse than average Beijing smog.
In January 2013, the reading for PM2.5 in Beijing air reached its high-
est recorded levels since the US Embassy there began independently track-
ing pollution levels in 2008. Readings were over 750 on the 1–500 scale of 
the US Environmental Protection Agency air quality index, and up to 900 at 
some stations. When the reading first broached 500, the US Embassy twit-
ter feed indicated ‘crazy bad’, a non-official description that was not orig-
inally meant for public dissemination because no-one imagined that the 



















Good morning, Shanghai: image taken at Tianlin Road, 26 January 2013.
Photo: Phreddie
Oxygen infusion in Shanghai, 16 June 2013. 






















some idea of the size of such particles, we would note that the dot above the 
letter ‘i’ in a typical newspaper measures about 400 microns. Micro-parti-
cles collect in vital organs and can also enter the body through the surface 
of the skin. Since the nineteenth century, people in industrialised cities 
have suffered unknowingly from some amount of exposure to micro-pol-
lutants. Scientific knowledge of the health consequences of PM2.5 has cir-
culated only since the early 2000s. The fact that China is industrialising at 
a time when pollution is a global concern means that its citizens and for-
eign residents, as well as the media and potential visitors, expect that the 
authorities will strive to meet international standards. In response to the 
news about poor air quality, foreign tourist arrivals decreased markedly 
in 2013.
In 2012, the central Ministry of Environmental Protection outlined 
new requirements for cities to monitor and report on ambient air qual-
ity standards. This policy is now being introduced incrementally in the 
leading cities of major industrial regions such as Beijing, Tianjin, Shang-
hai and Guangzhou, as well as in provincial capitals. The authorities fur-
ther stipulated that, in 2013, all of what are called ‘Key Environmental 
Protection Cities’ and ‘National Environmental Protection Model Cities’ 
had to monitor air quality. This will be followed in 2015 by the same re-
quirements for all prefecture-level cities (most large cities except Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing are prefecture-level) and other cities 
nationwide by 2016.
EPB should be the sole authoritative voice for making pronouncements on 
Beijing’s air quality’. By this logic, the ministry was unwilling to support 
a market in objective data.
 The hazardous air led people to coin the expression ‘airpocalypse’ 
(kongqi mori 空气末日) that captured the public sense of panic. People 
blogged about ‘refusing to be human vacuum cleaners’ (jujue zuo renrou 
xichenqi 拒绝做人肉吸塵器) and recorded their experiences: ‘I’m standing in 
front of Tiananmen but can’t see [the huge portrait on Tiananmen Gate 
of] Chairman Mao’ (zhan zai Tiananmen qian, que kanbujian Mao zhuxi 站
在天安门前, 却看不见毛主席). Reports that the smog was also registering in-
doors, inside public buildings, were alarming and sometimes appeared in 
contradictory terms that defied reality: ‘The interior of the gleaming Ter-
minal 3 of the Beijing Capital International Airport was filled with a thick 
haze on Thursday’. In another account, anxious hotel guests ran for a fire 
alarm after encountering smoke in the hallway, only to learn that it was 
osmotic smog. The security authorities, having painstakingly installed 
unprecedented numbers of surveillance cameras in public spaces such as 
Wangfujing Mall and Tiananmen Square, as well as around party-state 
government compounds in recent years, were also worried to find them-
selves blinded by the persistent thick haze.
Once the authorities started reporting PM2.5 levels, local govern-
ments expanded their air quality monitoring capacity. In January 2013, 
for example, Shanghai introduced a user-friendly air quality index in the 
form of an anime-style face whose six different expressions correspond to 
air quality levels. More importantly, the Shanghai Environmental Protec-
tion Bureau now provides real-time air quality data for a range of air qual-
ity indicators: PM2.5, O3, CO, PM10, SO2 and NO2, based on an aggregate of 
information from ten measuring stations.
 China’s Environmental Protection Bureau has historically preferred 
reporting on the larger particulate measurement of PM10, which is equal 
to ten microns, or ten millionths of a metre. PM2.5 is only 2.5 microns. (For 


















Real-time Air Quality Reporting System in Shanghai, 26 September 2013. 






















Modelling the National City
exceeded their quotas, they could accrue rewards; they commonly masked 
their failures and faked their successes through inflated statistics. This 
had disastrous implications for overall economic management. 
The model city programs in China today have their historical and aes-
thetic roots in such Maoist-era models and the political campaigns used to 
promote them. For example, big red banners with political statements and 
exhortations still herald ‘model’ activities. Yet now, instead of basing a mod-
el on a particular place, such as was the case when the whole nation was 
exhorted to ‘In Industry Learn from Daqing’ (gongye xue Daqing 工业学大
庆), the contemporary approach combines measures for social control with 
regulations for urban governance. What has not changed is that today’s 
model city guidelines provide idealised visions of development, official-
ly approved standards for urban modernisation. An early contemporary 
example of such a campaign was the National Environmental Protection 
Model Cities program launched in 1997. Others include the National Eco-
logical Garden City, National Hygienic City, National Model City for Science 
and Technology, National Excellent City for Comprehensive Management 
of Public Security and National Entrepreneurial City. But unlike schemes 
targeting one particular goal, the National Civilised City model involves 
a set of goals, criteria and indices of measurement designed to regularise 
urban governance and promote its standards nationwide.
Because rapid industrialisation and rapid urbanisation have proceeded 
hand in hand, China takes a multi-faceted approach to questions related 
to modernisation and development. Still, many forms of urban policy are 
neither readily visible to observers nor directly comparable to the kind of 
approaches taken in other countries. For example, in China today there 
are different types of what are called ‘model cities’ (mofan chengshi 模范
城市). The political history of the ‘model’ (mofan 模范 or dianxing 典型) in 
China derives from the Maoist-era use of model production workers, mod-
el streets and model places, which the propaganda apparatus held up for 
emulation. The most famous model places in the Maoist heyday were the 
oilfields of Daqing (Daqing youtian 大庆油田) and Dazhai People’s Commune 
(Dazhai renmin gongshe 大寨人民公社). The media repetitively idealised 
their trumped-up successes in collective production and support for the 
party-state: as sites for political pilgrimage they were outstanding symbols 
of Potemkin-village propaganda. They were also geographical contexts for 
the Stakhanovite labour mobilisation model, introduced to China from the 
Soviet Union in the 1940s. Alexey Stakhanov was the mythologised model 
worker who symbolised a zealous socialist work ethic and ‘socialist com-
petition’. Villages, factories or industrial towns thus competed to increase 










































keywords used in the slogans invoke ideas about the role of the individual 
in striving to build modern cities. Together they convey the notion that the 
future of China lies in the city as a paragon of national modernisation and 
development. 
For these reasons, talk of wenming in China invariably invokes anoth-
er idea, that of suzhi. As we noted in the introduction to this Yearbook, it is a 
term that can roughly be translated as the ‘quality’, demeanour or overall 
value of a person or people.
At the start of the Reform era in 1979 and the launching of policies 
leading to radical modernisation, China’s leaders expressed concern about 
the quality of its population (renkou suzhi 人口素质), fearing that low levels 
of education, widespread lawless behaviour, and people’s lack of ability to 
cope with rapid change would limit China’s potential to catch up with other 
countries. The concern with suzhi, which dates back to the early twentieth 
century, is integral to the party-state’s efforts to create the kind of civilised 
society it envisages for China and to achieve the goals of Socialist Spiritual 
Civilisation. For the authorities, this is the human development side of eco-
nomic growth in national modernisation. The building of civilised cities 
today is the latest in a series of political campaigns to improve the suzhi of 
the country’s citizens as a whole.
The National Civilised City 
(Quanguo wenming chengshi 
全国文明城市) campaign is a top-
down, commercialised form of 
post-socialist mobilisation or 
agitprop. It features, among 
other things, propaganda slo-
gans in large colourful Chinese 
characters printed on all kinds 
of conspicuous billboards and 
other kinds of signs. This kind 
of Mao-era ‘red’ practice might 
seem out of step with the con-
temporary urban environ-
ment, but it is a central, and 
highly visible, feature of par-
ty-led socialist modernisation. 
The language used in these slo-
gans harks back to the Spiritu-
al Civilisation campaigns of the 1980s mentioned earlier in this volume. 
Today, following the prompts of the new leadership of Xi Jinping and Li 
Keqiang, ‘The China Dream’ prominently features in many of these urban 
slogans; under the previous decade-long rule of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, 
the key phrase was to create a ‘Harmonious Society’ (hexie shehui 和谐社会).
At the core of all of these exhortations is the tireless injunction to ‘con-
struct a civilised society, build a civilised city’. The language often includes 
paired characters or phrases relating the actions of the individual to the 
quality of the society or collective. Many of the slogans repeat the term 
‘civilised’ (wenming 文明) the key expression of this Yearbook — several 
times over with different yet related meanings. Other slogans draw explic-
it connections between the behaviour of the individual and urban devel-
opment. Numerous variations exist, tailored to particular cities. All of the 
Slogans for Civilised Cities 
争做文明人,共创文明城   
Collectively strive to be civilised, together build a 
civilised city.
手牵手共建和谐城,心连心同做文明人   
Together build a harmonious city, heart to heart, 
unite to become civilised people.
树文明新风,做文明市民,创文明城市   
Establish civilised new ways of doing things, be 
civilised citizens and create a civilised city. 
市民素质高一分,城市形象美十分   
Each small improvement in the character of its 
citizens results in a great improvement in the 
image of their city.
说文明话,办文明事,做文明人,创文明城   
Speak in a civilised manner, do things in a 
civilised fashion, be a civilised person and build 
a civilised city.
创建文明城市,优化城市环境,促进经济发展   
Create a civilised city, optimise the urban envi-
ronment and promote economic development.
建设生态文明城市   









































How to be a Civilised City
‘National Civilised City’ is an honorary title granted by the Central Steering Commission for 
Building Spiritual Civilisation. The commission awards the title to urban governments in recog-
nition of attainment of party-designated standards in several categories including education 
of party officials, promotion of the rule of law, public security, development of the consumer 
environment, provision of new cultural facilities, volunteer social services organisation and en-
vironmental quality. As the highest state honour for Chinese cities, the title of Civilised City is 
much sought after by urban officials. 
 To be awarded the title, a city must apply for evaluation and demonstrate ‘clean’ govern-
ment. Subsequent to preliminary assessment, cities are subject to local site inspection includ-
ing interviews with local citizens. Each of the eleven categories of standards is subject to mul-
tiple criteria of evaluation and assessment. The following is a selection from the Civilised City 
Evaluation Work Manual, which contains over one hundred separate items of evaluation of the 
goals specified in the National Civilised City Assessment System. Each criterion involves various 
standards of qualitative or quantitative assessment:
• Study and promulgation of party theory and policy (lilun xuexi yu xuanchuan 理论学习与
宣传)
• Education of party cadres (ganbu xuexi jiaoyu 干部学习教育)
• Scientific and democratic system for decision-making (jianli kexue minzhu juece zhidu 
建立科学民主决策制度 )
• Government transparency (zhengwu gongkai 政务公开)
• Observance of government regulations by officials (yifa xingzheng 依法行政 )
• Legal propaganda and education (fazhi xuanchuan jiaoyu 法制宣传教育)
• Legal aid and services (falü yuanzhu yu fuwu 法律援助与服务)
• Protection of labour rights (weihu laodongzhe hefa quanyi 维护劳动者合法权益)
• Protection of gender equality (weihu nannüpingdeng 维护男女平等)
• Protection of the rights of minors and senior citizens (weichengnianren, laonianren quanyi 
baohu 未成年人 , 老年人权益保护)
• Protection of migrant workers’ rights (jincheng wugong renyuan quanyi baozhang 进城务
工人员权益保障)
• Complaints of violation of rights of disabled people, per ten thousand households (qinfan 
canjiren hefa quanyi shijian tousulü – qi/wanhu 侵犯残疾人合法权益事件投诉率 – 起/万户)
• Strengthening grassroots-level Party and Youth League organisation (jiceng dang, tuan zu-
zhi jianshe 基层党, 团组织建设)
• Democratic establishment and administration of community residential committees 
(shequ juweihuide minzhu jianshe yu guanli 社区居委会的民主建设与管理)
• Public safety and security (gonggong anquan baozhang 公共安全保障)
• Emergency response systems (tufa gonggong shijian yingji chuli 突发公共事件应急处理)
• Maintenance of social stability (weihu shehui wending 维护社会稳定 )
• Promotion of retail shops without counterfeit products (kaizhan ‘baicheng wandian wu jia-
huo’ huodong 开展‘百城万店无假货’活动)
• Anti-smuggling and ‘anti-fake’ campaigns (daji zousi fansi, jiamao weilie chan shangpin 
打击走私贩私, 假冒伪劣产商品)
• Protection of the legal rights and interests of businesses (weihu qiye hefa quanyi 维护企业
合法权益)
• Civic education (shimin jiaoyu 市民教育)
• Moral and ideological education of minors (weichengnianren sixiang daode jiaoyu 未成年
人思想道德教育)
• Education expenditure per capita 
(renjun jiaoyu jingfei zhichu 人均教
育经费支出)
• Frequency of large-scale cultural 
events held in public squares (da- 
xing guangchang wenhua huodong 
cishu 大型广场文化活动次数 )
• Public libraries (gonggong tushu-
guan 公共图书馆)
• Art museums, cultural centres 
and places for community cultural 
activities (yiguan, wenhua guan, 
shequ wenhua huodong changsuo 
艺馆, 文化馆, 社区文化活动场所)
• Sports facilities per capita meas-
ured in square metres (renjun tiyu changdi mianji 人均体育场地面积)
• Regulation of publications (chubanwu guanli 出版物管理) 
• Establishment and regulation of Internet culture (wangluo wenhua jianshe yu guanli 网络
文化建设与管理)
• Protection of cultural heritage (wenhua yichan baohu 文化遗产保护)
• Popularisation of science knowledge and team building (kepu sheshi he kepu duiwu 科普
设施和科普队伍)
• Road manners and compliance with traffic regulations (shimin jiaotong xingwei 市民交通
行为)
• Good deeds [à la Lei Feng ] (jianyi yongwei 见义勇为)
• Charitable donations (cishan juanzhu 慈善捐助) 
• Volunteer organisations and activities (zhiyuanzhe zuzhi yu huodong 志愿者组织与活动)
• Level of GDP per capita (renjun GDP shuiping 人均GDP水平)
• Ownership of patents per one hundred thousand people (mei shiwan ren yongyou zhuanli 
shouquan shu 每十万人拥有专利授权数)
• Community health service centres (shequ weisheng fuwu zhongxin 社区卫生服务中心)
• Food safety (shipin anquan 食品安全)
• Drinking water sanitisation (yingyongshui weisheng 饮用水卫生)
• Average life expectancy (pingjun yuqi shouming 平均预期寿命)
• Urban and rural social assistance system (chengxiang shehui jiuzhu tixi 城乡社会救助体系)
• Per capita public green space (renjun gonggong lüdi 人均公共绿地)
• Rate of centralisation of treatment of urban sewage (chengshi shenghuo wushui jizhong 
chuli lü 城市生活污水集中处理率)
• Air pollution indices — API index <100 days per year (kongqi wuran zhishu – quannian API 
zhishu <100 de tianshu 空气污染指数 — 全年API指数<100的天数)
• Rate of compliance of stabilising pollutants and emissions from key industrial enterprises 
(zhongdian gongye qiye wuranwu paifang wending dabiao lü 重点工业企业污染物排放稳
定达标率)
• Energy conservation and emissions reduction (jieneng jianpai 节能减排).
Note: The Civilised Cities Evaluation Work Manual from which the above list is excerpted is 
available on Chinese document websites; there is no official website that openly lists these 


















A banner reading ‘Create a civilised city and build  























Becoming CivilisedGuiding Spiritual Civilisation
City governments voluntarily apply to be assessed for evaluation. To qual-
ify, jurisdictions must attain the status of being designated an ‘Advanced 
Civilised City’ (xianjin wenming chengshi 先进文明城市), based on a set of sta-
tistical indicators, in order to prepare for site evaluation. Local Spiritual Ci-
vilisation Offices in cities co-ordinate with other branches of government 
to plan and implement activities that will meet their goals in some nine 
categories, based on over 100 indicators. In 2005, the Spiritual Civilisation 
Commission recognised ten cities as National Civilised Cities. They were: 
Xiamen, Qingdao, Dalian, Ningbo, Shenzhen, Baotou, Zhongshan, Yantai, 
Langfang and Zhangjiagang. Three urban districts made the cut: Tianjin’s 
Heping district, Shanghai’s Pudong New Area and Beijing’s Xicheng dis-
Again, as mentioned elsewhere, in 1986 the Party passed a ‘Resolution on 
Guiding Principles for Building a Socialist Society with Spiritual Civilisa-
tion’. In 1997, it established a Central Guidance Commission for Building 
Spiritual Civilisation under the supervision of the Party’s Propaganda De-
partment. In 2003, the Spiritual Civilisation Commission set standards and 
selection procedures for National Civilised Cities at all levels of govern-
ment administration. There were to be: ‘national civilised cities and dis-
tricts’; ‘civilised villages and towns’; and ‘civilised [work] units’. In 2005, it 
promulgated a National Civilised City Assessment System (Quanguo wen-
ming chengshi ceping tixi 全国文明城市测评体系) in the form of government 
manuals for each administrative level, each of the three levels of city (shi 
市) as well as urban districts (shiqu 市区). New, updated editions of the man-
ual appeared in 2008 and 2011.
Evaluation of the implementation of these policies is the work of 
the City Investigation Team of the National Bureau of Statistics (Guojia tong-
jiju chengshi diaocha dui 国家统计局城市调查队). Team members sign non-dis-
closure agreements and are assigned to cities where they demonstrably 
have no conflicts of interest. Their task is to evaluate the goals and achieve-
ments of urban civilisation policies. Evaluators learn of their assignments 
when, en route to the airport, they open a confidential envelope specifying 
their destination and field sites. Like restaurant critics, they carry out their 
work incognito, posing as ordinary tourists; they stay in three-star hotels 
and travel by taxi to observe conditions in major commercial streets and at 
traffic junctions, in hospitals and markets, as well as some fifty randomly 
selected sites. They try public telephones, and ride public buses to tabulate 
how many people do, and do not, give up their seats for the elderly, preg-
nant women, the disabled and children. All visits are unannounced, in-
cluding neighbourhood visits during which they interview residents about 









































trict. Such formal recognition means that the named city or district can 
hold the title while continuing to ‘civilise’ itself over the following three- to 
four-year period, when they will be re-evaluated.
The introduction to the 2011 manual covering the National Civilised 
City Assessment System includes the numerous criteria necessary to apply to 
become a ‘Civilised City’; in particular, it emphasises ‘ideological and moral 
construction work’ for adolescents. Other prerequisites require clean and 
disaster-free government. For instance, in the twelve months preceding an 
application or the review of a positive evaluation as ‘civilised’, any rule vio-
lation or crime committed by a jurisdiction’s party secretary or mayor rules 
out the application or nullifies the place’s ‘civilised’ status. Any serious acci-
dent or incident within the jurisdiction, such as water pollution, food safety 
incident or major construction disaster also prevents a city from applying 
for the status, or may lead to a city being stripped of the honorific title. 
Among the cities named as being ‘civilised’ in 2005, six have retained 
their status through the 2009 and 2011 evaluations: Xiamen, Dalian, Ning-
bo, Baotou, Yantai and Zhangjiagang. Because the program treats provin-
cial-level cities as provinces, urban districts (rather than the city at large), 
may apply for civilised status. Xicheng district, Beijing and Heping district, 
Tianjin, retained their ‘civilised’ status over three rounds. In 2009, mean-
while, the Commission recognised eleven new cities and three new urban 
districts. Of the cities and districts named in 2005, all except Qingdao and 
Shanghai’s Pudong retained their titles. In 2011, the Commission recognised 
a record twenty-four cities and three districts. Among existing title-holders, 
all remained ‘civilised’ except Shenzhen, Zhongshan and Shanghai’s Jing’an 
district, only recognised in 2009. In 2011, Qingdao and Shanghai Pudong re-
gained National Civilised City status. Currently, there are a total of fifty na-
tional civilised cities; sixteen sub provincial, twenty-two at the prefectural 
level, four at the county level and eight urban districts.
CIVILISED TOILETS
In the run up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, one of the 
city’s most widely advertised projects was the construc-
tion and renovation of thousands of toilets and the intro-
duction of a star rating system for public facilities. In 2012 
and 2013, the state of the nation’s toilets continues to be 
associated with degrees of ‘civilisation’.
Jinan Open Toilet Alliance
A number of restaurants, department stores, hotels, and 
universities in Jinan, the capital city of Shandong province, 
formed an ‘Open Toilet Alliance’ in November 2012. Mem-
bers undertook to make their toilets available to the public. 
According to media reports in April 2013, the city plans to expand the alliance to 1,000 members 
by the end of the year, as part of its bid to win recognition as a ‘National Civilised City’. The city 
government also boasts of innovations including ‘fragrant toilets’ equipped to filter out odours 
and automatically perfume the air. In April 2013, Jinan hosted a study tour of over 400 urban 
law enforcers from all over China focused on the city’s ‘advanced experience’. 
Occupy Toilet Protest 
Inspired by the worldwide Occupy protest movements, a group of female students in Guang-
zhou launched their own ‘occupy’ movement. Fed up with long queues for the ladies’, twenty 
women marched into a men’s public toilet carrying colorful placards calling for equal waiting 
times for both sexes. Local media reported that provincial officials in Guangzhou responded by 
agreeing to increase the number of women’s toilets by fifty percent. Similar moves have been 
made in other cities. In Shaanxi province, the government ordered that new toilet facilities pro-
vide more cubicles for women than men. 
Renewed Standards for Toilets 
In May 2012, the Beijing Municipal Commission of City Administration and Environment re-
leased a new set of standards governing public toilets in the city (toilet campaigns in the 1980s 
had set the previous targets). The new standards impose a maximum limit of two flies per public 
toilet, and set out rules regarding odour and general cleanliness. As part of the upgrade, the 
commission would provide free toilet paper. According to the commission’s estimate, this will 
cost the municipal government as much as eighteen million yuan per year.
In February 2013, the Ministry of Health released draft regulations governing public toilets. 
Media reports suggest that, if approved, the new regulations will be more strictly enforced than 
the ministry’s previous toilet 
‘guidelines’. The draft document 
ranks public toilets into four 
classes, mainly based on odour. 
The draft also stipulates that the 
maximum fly-count for stand-
alone public toilets is three per 
square metre. The public toilets 
inside other buildings are only 


















A four-star rated toilet approved by 
the Beijing Tourism Administration.  
Photo: Rich & Cheryl
Sign in a men’s bathroom in Beijing:
‘Stand closer to the urinal, get closer 
























tor at a rate in keeping with its general revenue growth. The jurisdiction 
must provide regular, free activity programs at public libraries and sports 
facilities and free entry to museums and cultural and exhibition centres. 
The Party’s primary concern in the evaluation process is improve-
ment of the conduct of government and party officials. Category one gives 
priority to ‘continuing education for officials’, including the study of par-
ty documents as well as earning the ‘people’s satisfaction’ via significant 
measures to improve local social problems. To popularise the program 
and his role in its promotion, in 2009 the mayor of Shenzhen, Xu Zong- 
heng, launched a ‘one-hundred mayors network for the creation of civilised 
cities’. However, Shenzhen lost its own title when Xu was placed under in-
vestigation for serious violations of party discipline and subsequently dis-
missed for corruption. Shenzhen has since been working hard to regain its 
lost ‘civilised’ status. In March 2013, it became the first city to implement a 
‘civility law’, which imposes fines for ‘uncivilised’ public behaviour.
Making the Civilised City title contingent on a corruption-free official-
dom symbolically links in new ways the behaviour of officials to the city’s 
national standing. In an awarded Civilised City, this link also potentially 
intensifies public opprobrium of corrupt officials. The seaside Shandong 
provincial city of Qingdao lost its title in 2009 due to one of the outstanding 
scandals of the 2000s — the corruption of Du Shicheng, party secretary of 
the city from 2002, who took millions in bribes and awarded his mistress, 
Li Wei, large contracts for Olympics-related projects when the city was 
preparing to host the sailing competition of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Du 
was removed in 2007 and sentenced to life in prison in February 2008. The 
Pudong district of Shanghai also lost its title as a consequence of corrupt 
land and real estate dealings. The Vice-Mayor of Pudong from 2004–2007, 
Kang Huijun, had earned the nickname ‘the new landlord of Pudong’ and 
‘director of real estate speculation’ because he benefitted from control over 
the access to real estate in Liujiazui and Jinqiao — the two major develop-
ment zones in Pudong. He also managed to acquire multiple apartments at 
below-market prices. He was sentenced to life in prison in 2009. 
The current evaluation manual emphasises some categories more than 
others. Categories four, five and six, which together cover social and cul-
tural resources, management and services, are the most clearly articu-
lated. Among them, category four, ‘healthy human environment’, has the 
most criteria. Not surprisingly, these include evidence of such ‘civilised be-
haviours’ as no spitting, littering and so forth. There’s a Lei Feng-style sec-
tion on moral conduct and sections on volunteerism, which reflect histor-
ical practices and values from the Maoist era. More than 90 percent of the 
citizens of the aspiring Civilised City must be aware of volunteer service 
organisations, and at least eight percent must undertake volunteer work. 
This category also includes international-style urban development criteria 
for cultural affairs and the development of cultural industries. Cities must 
make an economic commitment to cultural services for which the evalua-


















The Yan’an Elevated Road in Jing’an, Shanghai is illuminated with LEDs on Friday and Saturday nights. 






















Category eight in the civilising process requires an ‘ecologically sustain-
able environment’. This includes the management of air quality based 
on national standards. The rapidity with which cities have installed air 
quality monitors since the official recognition of PM2.5 mentioned above, 
and placed data online, led in 2013 to the creation of a major new website 
(www.aqicn.org) that collates data from cities across the country. The web-
site features individual maps depicting the locations of air quality mon-
itors in each city and a national map showing simultaneous Air Quality 
Index readings in dozens of cities.
A National Public Civilisation Index (Quanguo wenming zhishu ceping 
全国文明指数测评) assesses on an annual basis the progress made by aspir-
ing cities. By the end of 2012, the National Bureau of Statistics revealed 
that Xiamen in the southern coastal province of Fujian ranked first overall 
for the second year in a row and, in the area of the ‘moral education of 
teenagers’, second only to Qingdao, Shandong province. Xiamen’s distinc-
tions also included boasting a 9.6 percent volunteer rate, with increasing 
numbers of volunteers at airports, bus stations, hospitals and tourist spots. 
To address public concerns related to food safety, the city government im-
plemented an online supervision system tracking fresh and pre-packaged 
foods in supermarkets from more than 10,000 companies: when a substan-
dard product is found its producer is publicly identified. Xiamen also hosts 
blogs for ‘civilised adolescents’ involving more than 380 primary and sec-
ondary schools and about 50,000 student bloggers.
Shenzhen’s Civility Law  
To promote civilised behaviour, the People’s Congress of Shenzhen passed a law that punishes 
inappropriate conduct ranging from spitting and smoking to allowing pets to defecate in public 
places, imposing fines from 200 to 10,000 yuan. It’s believed that the law, called Regulations 
for the Promotion of Civilised Behaviour (Shenzhen jingji tequ wenming xingwei cujin tiaoli 深
圳经济特区文明行为促进条例) is the first attempt by a city to promote civic behaviour through 
legislation.
Multiple offenders with more than five violations within two years face an additional fine of 
1,000 yuan. Those who have violated more than ten times in two years will have their offences 
written into their profile in a national ‘personal credit system’ (geren xinyong jilu xitong 个人信用
记录系统), with consequences such as a diminished likelihood of getting a home loan or obtain-
ing a credit card. The law allows offenders to do community service work as an alternative to the 
payment of their fines but only up to one half of the total monetary amount. 
 The law also encourages good civic behaviour such as blood donation and organ and stem 
cell donation by dictating that such noble deeds will be recorded in the person’s ‘civilised behav-
ior archives’, entitling them to benefits including cash rewards and priority in receiving blood 
transfusions. 
The city’s urban law enforcement bureau, which oversees chengguan, is responsible for 
enforcing the civility law with assistance from the police. Law enforcement officers are required 
to issue receipts to people who pay fines for uncivil behaviour. It fails to specify how revenue 
from the fines will be used, saying only that all revenues will go into the city’s coffers.
Questions remain about how effective the new laws will be. A news report in the English 
language Shenzhen Daily in April 2013 observed that ‘when an unidentified male driver spat out 
a window of his car last week in central Futian district, nobody showed up to charge him a fine 


















Ribbon dancer in Xiamen. 
Photo: Hsing Wei























The Idea of Rank
Most countries define cities by population size. China primarily defines 
cities by their administrative rank, from provincial-level city (zhixia shi 
直辖市) to prefecture-level city (diji shi 地级市) and county-level city (xianji 
shi 县级市). Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing are defined as mu-
nicipalities that are under the direct control or jurisdiction of the central 
government on the same level as a province. A city’s place in this system 
determines its ‘rank’ (jibie 级别) in the hierarchy.
The significance of rank is apparent in the documents of the Civilised 
City program. Reports on the National Civilised City program make no ref-
erence to a city’s particular history, specific culture, or to distinctive places 
within a city including World Heritage sites. The standardised outcomes of 
the National Civilised City program present only the name of a city listed 
in order of administrative rank, from prefecture-level cities and districts 
of provincial-level cities to ‘civilised town’ and ‘civilised units’. Documents 
do not report why a city has attained Civilised City status, or why it has lost 
it. If a city loses its title, its name simply disappears from the list.
In Chinese, the multiple meanings of the word pin 品 help explain 
some of the deeper meanings of the ideas around ‘rank’. Among the slogans 
appearing in Shenzhen’s civilising landscape was ‘Construct a High-grade 
Cultural Shenzhen City’ (ba Shenzhen jiancheng gao pinwei wenhua cheng-
shi 把深圳建成高品位文化城市). Here the pin in pinwei or ‘grade’ covers no-
tions of rank, measurement and status. Yet pin has additional meanings. 
Pin is composed of three kou 口 or mouths. It implies not merely to ‘taste or 
sample’ (pinchang 品尝) whether a food is salty or sweet or of high quality 
as in ‘taste (appreciate) fine tea’ (pin ming 品茗), but also taste in the cul-
tured or ‘civilised’ sense of the ability to discern quality. 
As a single character it can be a noun indicating, for example, a high 
rank in the dynastic court: it appeared in this sense as early as the Tang 
dynasty (618–907) and the last dynasty, the Qing (1644–1911), had nine pin 
or ‘ranks’ of bureaucrats. It could also mean temperament or character, or 
small commodities or products. As a verb it may mean to sample, appraise, 
rate or judge. Paired with other characters it can form compounds such 
as pinde 品德 and pinge 品格, both conveying the sense of moral character; 
pinxing 品行, conduct or behaviour; pinwei 品味, taste or sensibility; pinping 
品评, to judge, adjudicate or comment on; pinzhong 品种, variety or breed; 
pinzhi 品质, quality; pinwei 品位, grade or rank and pinpai 品牌, brand. 
From ancient times to the present, this one character connects these di-
verse ideas about rank and assessment with notions of inherent quality.
Pin 品 parses and elevates what is distinctive within categories. With 
uneven social development in China, the concept of pin informs party-state 
concerns about the potential to transform the suzhi of the population. Yet 
the notion of striving for ‘scientific’ improvement in the suzhi of individu-
als holds less significance today than the historical mission of civilising the 
collective. In the Reform era, the city is the key collective and holds highest 
rank among places, and so the National Civilised City ranks first in the offi-


















From the series ‘Great Mall of China’ 中华商城.























Both netizens and officials have been critical of China’s Civilised City 
program. They point out that vibrant urban life with a basis in cultur-
al diversity is different from the tireless, standardised check-list of Ci-
vilised City criteria as identified by the party-state. Even the style in 
which a civilising campaign (chuangzao wenming chengshi 创造文明 
城市, chuangwen 创文 for short) is launched — floral displays and co-
lourful potted plants lining the roadsides, red banners flying overhead, 
streets suddenly swept clear of vendors and buzzing with red-jacketed 
volunteers — recalls the aesthetic style of mid-twentieth century com-
munism and mass mobilisation campaigns. It seems out of step with 
China’s new, high-rise, consumer-oriented urban environments.
The Civilised City program also appears, at least superficially, to be 
at odds with China’s development of modern ranking systems and the 
Party’s emphasis on becoming ‘world class’ in all areas, from produc-
tive capacities to the knowledge economy and cities themselves. But the 
red legacies of socialism remain strong in China, and have been reartic-
ulated since the rise of Xi Jinping in late 2012. The Civilised City system 
links enduring values of the party-state with contemporary principles 
of urban development under global capitalism. The shift to extreme 
marketisation or neoliberalism in the world economy since the 1980s 
encourages ranking schemes and quantitative indicators as a way of at-
tracting economic interests. The neoliberal world economy readily ac-
commodates the politics of rank in China — where the market and the 
state combine in inventive ways that powerfully endorse numbers and 
urban rankings.
On one level, China’s National Civilised City program strives to im-
prove the roles and functions of modern urban government. It promotes 
the co-ordination of government services, social needs, economic devel-
opment, environmental quality and culture as conceived by the state. It 
has grown well beyond the system of political-linguistic techniques that 
have existed throughout the sixty-four year history of the People’s Re-
public for socialising and coercing citizen conduct. It promotes replica-
Urban Law Enforcers: Agents of Civility or Thugs? 
China’s urban law enforcement officers, known as chengguan 
城管 (short for Urban Management Regulation Enforcement Teams, 
Chengshi guanli xingzheng zhifa dadui 城市管理行政执法大队) don’t 
have a very good reputation — the word is sometimes used both 
online and off as a synonym for ‘thug’. Chengguan regularly make 
the news and raise the hackles of commentators on social media 
for harassing and assaulting street vendors, beggars and others. 
‘Beat Him, Take Everything Away’, a Human Rights Watch report 
published in 2012, explained the well-intentioned rationale behind 
the chengguan system like this: 
The legal basis for the creation of the chengguan is the Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on Administrative Penalty (here-
after, Administrative Penalties Law), passed in March 1996. 
That law did not specifically call for the creation of the cheng-
guan, nor did it use that term. Instead, the law empowered 
provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities to ‘entrust 
an organization … with imposing administrative penalties’ re-
garding matters falling outside the realm of criminal law and 
the authority of the Public Security Bureau (China’s police) … .
 The goals of the Chinese government appear to have been 
streamlining enforcement of local administrative regulations 
which were traditionally the responsibility of multiple local 
government departments, minimizing opportunities for cor-
ruption and abuse of power, and better controlling public un-
rest… .
The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences scholar Zhou Hanhua [has remarked:]
Originally [urban social control] issues were handled by the danwei (单位), the work unit, to 
which Chinese employees were once closely bound. The danwei … prevented people from 
engaging in [commercial] enterprises on the side. The decline of China’s state-owned en-
terprises in the 1990s precipitated the breakdown of the danwei system. At the same time, 
the country grew increasingly urbanized and millions of migrant workers poured into the 
cities. The traditional [urban social control] system could no longer manage [so] the cheng-
guan were established to handle the problems of the urban environment.
It was not until August 2002 that the central government published a directive outlining eight 
specific areas of administrative law — ranging from environmental sanitation and traffic regu-
lations to urban beautification rules — that provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities 
may delegate to chengguan. But even that directive does not specify permissible and prohib-
ited means of enforcement, or set forth rules to guide the deportment and accountability of 
relevant enforcement personnel.
In the absence of such rules and guidelines and operating under municipal and local gov-
ernments but with shadowy connections to local police, the chengguan often employ brutish 
tactics to keep casual street vendors in order or off the streets, chase away beggars, and regu-
late outdoor advertising and noise pollution. In some areas, they also manage the allocation 


















Chengguan officers busy 
taking down the fence 
around an illegal construc-
tion before demolition, 
while being filmed by 
local TV, in Zhabei district, 























ble standards and the involvement of both citi-
zens and officials in developing more open and 
transparent forms of government behaviour and citizen compliance.
On another level, the program’s emphasis on volunteerism or citi-
zen participation in forms of social support and societal monitoring links 
it to the Maoist era tradition of ‘mobilising the grassroots’ — the masses 
— to carry out unpaid social and productive work. It maintains and ex-
pands citizen involvement in the policing of public places. Its ideological 
impact is especially evident in government programs to socialise teenag-
ers and young people by training them to use state-approved online ser-
vices and blogs in accordance with official guidelines. In these ways, the 
party-state continues its attempts to control social behaviour and create 
a future nation of uniformly ‘civilised’, ideologically homogenous and 
modern places — a Chinese version of the ‘world class’ city.
Chengguan are People Too
A propaganda video appeared online that was said to be the work of Jiang Yifan, a chengguan 
from Changzhou, Jiangsu province. The video was intended to humanise the chengguan and 
show that they are just trying to do a good job. Below is a description of the on-camera action 
together with a translation of the subtitle to each scene:
Jiang and a fellow chengguan point at vendors on the street:  
All you ever see are my extremely strict words.
A bowl of instant noodles is steaming on Jiang’s desk, his wife is on the phone,  
he’s working overtime: But you don’t see all my tears and worries.
A female vendor is cooking snacks on the street: You have your livelihood.
Jiang and his colleague are standing in front of the female vendor and  
writing in their notebooks: … and I have my duty.
Other people on the street are laughing and pointing: You can hold our job in disdain.
Street scenes of traffic and buildings: But we can show you who is really  
beautifying the city.
Close-up images of Jiang working on a computer:  
Being a chengguan will always be controversial.
Jiang stands watch on the street: We are questioned and mocked wherever we go.
Jiang looks at himself in the mirror while putting on his uniform:  
Despite all this, even if no one understands.
Jiang pushes open a door to face the camera: We will march courageously forward.











































The People’s Daily and Civilised Driving
China’s roads may not be the world’s most dangerous: India has more road deaths in absolute 
terms as well as per capita. But neither are they associated with safe and orderly driving. The 
explosive growth in private and commercial traffic has brought with it frequent gridlock and 
increasingly blatant road safety violations. While official statistics show a decline in traffic ac-
cidents and road deaths over the past decade, the World Health Organization’s Global Status 
Report on Road Safety 2013 estimates that actual numbers are nearly four times higher than 
the reported figures. 
That China’s road safety still lags behind the developed world inspires constant hand 
wringing in the state media. In 2008, Xinhua noted that the China Traffic Safety Forum’s 2007 
figure of 5.1 road deaths for every 10,000 motor vehicles was worse than every developed coun-
try and more than double the global average. Xinhua specifically highlighted problem behavior 
including switching lanes without signaling, ignoring traffic lights, driving against the traffic and 
reversing on a highway to catch a missed exit.
In October 2012, the People’s Daily published an opinion piece on the state of  ‘uncivilised 
driving’ in China and what to do about it. It quoted from the 2011 ‘China Automobile Com-
munity Development Report’ (Zhongguo qiche shehui fazhan baogao 中国汽车社会发展报告), 
which predicted that there would be 86.5 million private vehicles on the road in China by 2013. 
(The most recent edition predicts over 100 million this year.) The newspaper, the Party’s official 
mouthpiece, observed that while China has become a car society, it has not succeeded in teach-
ing people behind the wheel to drive properly. How to remedy the state of uncivilised driving? 
Mostly by the cultivation of healthy driving habits, the paper insisted, backed up by strict en-
forcement of rules and regulations. 
From 1 January 2013, a new set of rules, Regulations Covering the Application for and Use 
of a Motor Vehicle Driver’s License (Jidongche jiashizheng shenling he shiyong guiding 机动车
驾驶证申领和使用规定) impose hefty penalties on traffic violations. Anyone caught running a 
yellow light has six points deducted from their license. Those who cover up their license plates 
to avoid being identified by surveillance cameras (a common ruse) risk losing twelve points 
— effectively an automatic license suspension. Online, drivers harshly criticised the new rule 
governing yellow lights: if going through a yellow light is forbidden, they asked, then why not 
just have green and red lights? 
Whether as a result of self-restraint or 
heightened enforcement, just one month 
after the promulgation of what a social 
media meme called ‘the most severe traf-
fic law in history’, Xinhua was able to re-
port an improvement on China’s roads: 
‘China reported a dramatic decline of traf-
fic violations and road accidents in Janu-
ary’. According to the Traffic Administra-
tion Bureau, the death toll from running 
traffic lights and speeding fell 13.3 percent 
and 71.2 percent respectively compared 
with the previous year. There were about 
1.37 million cases of traffic light violations 
in January, a 40 percent decrease from the 
same period in 2012, and 285,000 cases of 


















Without lines or traffic lights,  
a variety of vehicles jammed in the 
middle of the street.
Photo: Let Ideas Compete
